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Smart home Internet-of-Things (IoT) accompanied by smart home apps has wit-
nessed tremendous growth in the past few years. Yet, the security and privacy of the
smart home IoT devices and apps have raised serious concerns, as they are getting
increasingly complicated each day, expected to store and exchange extremely sensitive
personal data, always on and connected, and commonly exposed to any users in a
sensitive environment. Nowadays wireless smart home IoT devices rely on electromag-
netic wave-based radio-frequency (RF) technology to establish fast and reliable quality
network connections. However, RF has its limitations that can negatively affect the
smart home user experience and even cause serious security issue, such as crowded
spectrum resources and RF waves leakage. To overcome those limitations, people
have to use technology with sophisticated time and frequency division management
and rely on the assumptions that the attackers have limited computational power.
In this thesis we propose URadio, a wideband ultrasonic communication system, us-
ing electrostatic ultrasonic transducers. We design and develop two different types of
transducer membranes using two types of extremely thin materials, Aluminized Mylar
Film (AMF) and reduced Graphene Oxide (rGO), for assembling transducers, which
achieve at least 45 times more bandwidth than commercial transducers. Equipped
with the new wideband transducers, an OFDM communication system is designed
to better utilize the available 600 kHz wide bandwidth. Our experiments show that
URadio can achieve an unprecedentedly 4.8 Mbps data rate with a communication
range of 17 cm. The attainable communication range is increased to 31 cm and 35
cm with data rates of 1.2 Mbps and 0.6 Mbps using QPSK and BPSK, respectively.
Although the current wideband system only supports short-range communication, it
is expected to extend the transmission range with better acoustic engineering. Also,
by conducting experiments to measure the ultrasonic adversaries’ eavesdropping and
jamming performance, we prove that our system is physically secure even when ex-
changing plaintext data.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the past few years, smart home Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices have experi-
enced tremendous growth. Intelligence and sophistication of home automation sys-
tems, remote control system and human-machine interaction system, which provide
all types of appliance information and data exchanging infrastructure and services,
are increasing rapidly year by year.
Radio Frequency (RF) based communication protocols, such as WiFi, Bluetooth,
Zigbee, and Z-wave, have been used to connect IoT devices. However, since the signal
travels in the form of electromagnetic wave, which has the properties of wide spread-
ing, omnidirectional and penetrating, IoT devices are inherently susceptible to the
common attacks towards wireless networks, including radio jamming [1], eavesdrop-
ping [2], and signal manipulation attacks [3].
Airborne ultrasonic communication has recently aroused many researchers’ in-
terests due to its advantages over traditional RF communication, which suffers from
strict frequency spectrum regulation, severe interference with an increasing number of
devices crowd in a narrow bandwidth and aggregating security concerns in an adverse
environment. Ultrasonic data transmission, on the other hand, due to its Line-of-sight
2(LoS) transmission property, can be implemented using any acoustic frequency bands
in an interference-free manner. Also, there is currently no regulation on ultrasound
spectrum usage. Moreover, compared with RF signals, ultrasonic signals attenuate
greatly in the air and has much shorter wavelength compared with its electromag-
netic wave counterpart at the same frequency, which makes it difficult to intercept, as
highly-directional ultrasonic signals can only transmit effectively over the line of sight
(LoS) links, and could not penetrate through solid walls [4]. These unique features
of ultrasonic communication greatly reduce its exposure risks to the eavesdroppers
and jammers. However, airborne ultrasonic communication suffers from limited band-
width due to the severe propagation loss of ultrasound at MegaHertz frequency and
the limited bandwidth of existing ultrasonic transducers.
Recent studies have investigated practical ultrasonic data transmission with real
system implementations. In [5], a wearable ultrasonic communication system, U-
Wear, is implemented to achieve a data rate of 2.76 Kbps using Gaussian Minimum
Shift Keying (GMSK) modulation. In [6], an ultrasonic communication system is
developed that exploits the nonlinear behavior of the microphone’s membrane to
transform an ultrasonic signal into an audible signal, which achieves a data rate of
4 Kbps. Chirp and Multiple Frequency-Shift Keying (MFSK) modulation have also
been used to transmit inaudible signals at 16 bps and 800 bps, respectively [7, 8].
These low data rate transmission systems meet the needs for some IoT applications
with intermittent data exchanges, e.g., text messaging, command-and-control, cross-
device tracking, and targeted advertising [9].
However, in today’s world, online picture browsing, large file sharing, or even video
streaming require a large quantity of modern smart home applications to achieve a
data rate exceeding 1 Mbps. Yet, designing a high-speed ultrasonic communication
system is practically challenging due to the limitation of an ultrasonic transducer
3bandwidth. To the best of our knowledge, there exist two airborne ultrasonic com-
munication systems that achieve a data rate of over 100 Kbps. Li et al. propose a
Quadrature Phase-Shift Keying (QPSK) modulated system that achieves a data rate
of 200 Kbps over 1.2 m [10]. Jiang et al. further propose an OFDM-based ultrasonic
communication [11] using a pair of lab-made transducers to achieve a data rate of 800
Kbps with 16-QAM over a range of 0.7 m.
1.2 Our Solution
In an acoustic transducer such as a microphone, air pressure (sound wave) induce
motion of a suspended diaphragm, which is in turn converted to an electrical signal.
The key to achieving wideband ultrasonic communication is to have a lightweight but
mechanically strong diaphragm for sound generation/detection. Thinner and lighter
diaphragms allow for more faithful tracking of sound vibration at high frequencies
and stronger material make the diaphragm to stay intact during vibration. Graphene,
being only one-atom-thick (0.33 nm) and mechanically strong, constructs the ultra-
lightweight diaphragms. However, Graphene diaphragms have been shown to be ex-
tremely brittle and subject to be fractured [12]. On the other hand, reduced Graphene
Oxide (rGO) has sufficient mechanical strength while preserving the thinness [13].
In this thesis, we present URadio, the fastest ultrasonic communication system
equipped with three different types of transducers, including a commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) transducer and two pairs of lab-made transducers, one of which uses
Aluminized Mylar Film (AMF) with a thinness of 2 µm and the other uses reduced
Graphene Oxide (rGO) membrane measured as 0.4 µm. We design an electrostatic
ultrasonic transducer structure integrated with the membranes to achieve the highest
reception sensitivity. URadio implements OFDM modulation to better utilize the
4wide bandwidth that is made available by the newly designed transducers. We thor-
oughly test the URadio system and show the high speed, efficiency, and security of
the proposed system.
1.3 Contributions
To sum up, this thesis makes the following contributions:
• We developed two types of acoustic membranes for transducers to achieve wide-
band ultrasonic communication. We design an OFDM based communication
system, URadio, to utilize the wide bandwidth for high-speed ultrasonic com-
munication.
• When equipped with COTS transducers, our system can achieve an error-free
transmission of 10.3 m at a data rate of 20 Kbps using BPSK modulation
scheme. When equipped with lab-made transducers, the communication data
rate can reach up to 4.8 Mbps using 64-QAM at an attainable range of 17 cm
in an error-free manner.
• Our ultrasonic communication system can operate in an interference-free man-
ner coexisted with RF systems in overcrowded RF environments or ultrasonic
environment. We evaluate image transfer capability of URadio, proving that
URadio can satisfy the need for high-speed data exchange among smart home
devices. We also show the system’s resistance against jamming and eavesdrop-
ping attacks. By performing two sets of indoor experiments, we demonstrate
that URadio can achieve a secure and high data rate transmission for smart
home applications.
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Related work
2.1 Ultrasonic Data Transmission
In this chapter, additional relevant previous work that has not been mentioned
before are reviewed. Using ultrasound as a carrier to achieve data transmission has
long been investigated. Jiang et al. [14] achieved a full-duplex point-to-point ultra-
sonic transmission by using two pairs of transducers, a function generator, and an
oscilloscope. U-Wear [5] goes beyond a simple point-to-point transmission scheme by
interconnecting multiple wearable devices using ultrasound.
Since ultrasound signals are inaudible, they can be used as hidden signals for
smart home devices, for both benign and malicious purposes. The nonlinear behavior
of MEMS microphones has been utilized to achieve data transmission [6]. Zhou et
al. enable real-time unobtrusive speaker-microphone data communication using ul-
trasonic signal [15], without affecting the primary audio-hearing experience of human
users.
62.2 Ultrasonic Inaudible Attacks
Also, the ultrasonic signal can be used maliciously to launch inaudible attacks,
which pose a threat to smart home security. In [16, 17], adversaries exploit the mi-
crophones’ non-linearity and send inaudible ultrasound to force the microphone to
record malicious ultrasonic signals as normal voice commands, thereby hijacking the
voice recognition system.
Small mechanic components at the scale of ultrasound wavelength in devices, such
as sensors, hard disk read-and-write head, are also susceptible to an airborne ultra-
sonic attack that exploits their mechanical resonant frequency. Bolton et al. launch
an ultrasonic attack on a mechanic hard disk drive, causing physical causality and
even OS failures [18]. Security researchers inject well-designed ultrasonic signals with
specific frequencies to sensors (i.e., gyroscope, accelerometer, etc), achieving a denial-
of-service attack or even arbitrary manipulation of sensor outputs [19–21]. While
these ultrasonic attacks towards smart home devices are devastating, we propose
URadio to use ultrasound to secure smart home communication.
7Chapter 3
Airborne Ultrasonic Communication
3.1 Ultrasonic Communication Background
Ultrasonic signal constitutes of longitudinal mechanical waves propagating in elas-
tic media (e.g., air) with a frequency above 20 kHz. Similar to RF signals, two main
factors contribute to ultrasound’s attenuation over the air, i.e., path loss and ab-
sorption. The former includes free-space loss, refraction, diffraction, reflection, and
aperture-medium coupling [22], while the latter factor denotes the absorption of ul-
trasound waves in the air that is largely depending on the temperature, pressure and
moisture [23].
The propagation speed of acoustic waves in air is approximate 340 m/s at a
temperature of 20◦C under an atmospheric pressure of 101.325 KPa, compared to
3× 108 m/s for RF waves. The low transmission speed brings a greater propagation
delay for data transmission across a long distance, which makes it well suited for
security-sensitive short-distance indoor applications.
Air-coupled ultrasonic transducers. Ultrasonic transducers serve as converters
to transform sound wave into electrical current or vice versa. Ultrasonic transducers
nowadays can be categorized into two main classes based on their physical mecha-
nisms, i.e. piezoelectric and electrostatic transducers. Piezoelectric transducers con-
8vert voltage variation into mechanical vibration through a piezoelectric element, which
can work under a low AC voltage level. However, a piezoelectric transducer usually
has a very narrow resonant bandwidth typically at 1 kHz. Electrostatic transducers
convert voltage variation into mechanical vibration using a membrane excited by an
electrostatic force. Electrostatic transducers require a high DC voltage between the
membrane and the electrode to drive the membrane’s vibration, but they introduce a
wider communication bandwidth, thereby enabling a higher data rate communication.
3.2 Threat Model in Smart Home Communications
Smart home IoT devices have been developed for in-home security monitoring and
the convenience of living. Smart home technologies rely on instant and reliable com-
munication between IoT devices. However, RF-based IoT devices are susceptible to a
wide range of attacks due to the physical properties of the RF signals. These attacks
can be categorized into passive attacks and active attacks [24]. The passive attackers
can utilize the wide-spreading property of RF signals to passively collect the transfer-
ring information without being detected, i.e., launching eavesdropping attacks. An
active attacker may attempt to alter system resources or disrupt its normal operation
by transmitting RF signals to the receivers. The active attack includes masquerading,
replay, message modification, denial of service (DoS), etc. Although countermeasures
exist at upper layers to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability, the physical
layer security threats are difficult to counteract. Particularly, the eavesdropping at-
tacks impose serious threats to a smart home environment in the presence of insider
adversaries that have access to encryption keys.
9Figure 3.1: URadio system architecture.
3.3 Problem Formulation
By substituting RF based smart home devices with its ultrasound-based coun-
terparts, the device would be much less vulnerable to the above-mentioned secu-
rity threats. Compared with RF signals, the ultrasonic signal can barely penetrate
through solid materials such as doors and walls. Ultrasonic signals attenuate faster
across the air and can only efficiently travel through LoS links. Since the jamming
and eavesdropping attacks require the signals to be dispersing, ultrasonic communi-
cation system becomes physically more secure. But the same property also limits
the available bandwidth of ultrasonic communication. There seems to be an intrinsic
conflict between achievable bandwidth and security. To make ultrasonic commu-
nication a reality, we need to develop a secure ultrasonic system that satisfies the
bandwidth requirement. In this thesis, we develop a system, URadio, to effectively
resolve the conflict between wideband communication and security. Not only is URa-
dio a wideband communication system, it simultaneously achieves jamming-resilient
communication, and is immune to eavesdropping attackers who are off the LoS path.
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Chapter 4
URadio System Design
URadio consists of a set of software components and hardware components. The
hardware components include a transducer and amplify circuit design, and the soft-
ware components implement an OFDM-based ultrasonic communication system. Fig. 3.1
presents the complete URadio system architecture.
4.1 Transducer Design
URadio has been equipped with three different types of transducers, including
a COTS transducer (SensComp 600 series) and two pairs of lab-made transducers,
to achieve wideband ultrasonic data transmission. The ultrasonic transducer, as a
frontend, is of utmost importance in ultrasonic communication, which serves as an
interface to the physical environment.
Most of the COTS ultrasonic transducers suffer from a narrow bandwidth. Com-
pared with COTS piezoelectric sensors, capacitive ultrasonic transducers have rela-
tively broader bandwidth. We choose a capacitive ultrasonic transducer, SensComp
600 series instrument grade ultrasonic sensor [25], to be integrated into URadio, which
is shown in Fig. 4.1. These sensors are made of a gold foil coated polymer membrane
and an Aluminum backplate with a diameter of 38.4 mm. The SensComp transduc-
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Figure 4.1: SensComp series 600 ultrasonic transducer.
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Figure 4.2: Frequency response of a pair of SensComp transducers placed one meter
from each other.
ers operate at a relatively low-frequency range between 45 kHz and 65 kHz. The
frequency response of SensComp is measured and presented in Fig. 4.2, which shows
the peak frequency response at around 50 KHz.
For high data rate transmission, the bandwidth should be extended. However,
the response of a traditional transducer, which measures the voltage variation of
the vibrating membrane, will reduce as the frequency rises. Therefore, we need to
develop wideband transducers using thinner materials. Formally, the movement of a
diaphragm could be modeled as a second-order spring-damping-mass system, where
the mass comes from the diaphragm, the damping force comes from the air, and the
12
spring represents the restoring force that brings diaphragm to the balanced position.
Therefore, the formula that describes the movement of the diaphragm can be written
as:
F = m
d2x
dt2
+ ζ
dx
dt
+ kx, (4.1)
where x is the displacement of the diaphragm, t is the time, m is the mass of di-
aphragm, ζ is the damping coefficient, k is the spring constant, and F is the driving
force applied on the diaphragm. When driven by a sinuous signal at frequency f , the
vibration amplitude can be written as:
|dx
dt
| = |F ||ζ + i(2pifm− (2pif)−1k)| . (4.2)
Here, the vibration amplitude is represented in the form of velocity rather than dis-
placement, because the sound pressure level (SPL) is directly determined by the
velocity amplitude of air:
SPL = cρ|dx
dt
|, (4.3)
where c is the sound velocity and ρ is the mass density of air. From the above
equations, we note that larger mass m results in poorer high frequency response (i.e.,
f in Eq. (4.2)). As a result, the mass density of the diaphragm sets an upper limit
on the frequency response of a transducer. It is thus clear that, in order to extend
the bandwidth, thinner and lighter diaphragms should be employed for more faithful
tracking of sound vibration at higher frequencies.
Fig. 4.3 illustrates the structure of the transducers, which we design and produce
using a 3D printer (the device is displayed in Fig. 4.4(a)). Briefly, the transducer
is built with an AMF membrane (2 µm thick, 7 mm in diameter) or an rGO mem-
brane (0.4 µm thick) suspended midway between two perforated electrodes, which
13
Membrane Spacer
Electrodes
Figure 4.3: The 3D structure of a transducer with a membrane separated by two
perforated electrodes with two spacers.
are constructed by a stainless steel is woven mesh sheet. Spacers, which are made of
polyethylene terephthalate (PET) sheet (100 um thick), sandwiches the membrane,
preventing it from touching the electrodes. For the transmitter (or speaker), the elec-
trical signal and the inverse of the signal are sent to the two electrodes separately.
According to Coulomb’s law, the voltage changes on the electrode result in mechan-
ical movements of the membrane, which further result in mechanic movements of
air according to Eq. (4.3). The air movements are then transformed into acoustic
waves, penetrating the electrodes and traveling over the air. The receiver (or micro-
phone) works in reverse order: the airborne acoustic wave can penetrate through the
electrodes to displace the membrane, thereby changing the capacitance between the
membrane and electrodes, and in turn causing charge redistribution and electrical
currents, which are the signals we aim to capture.
4.2 Design and Assembly of Membranes
Aluminized Mylar Film (AMF) membrane development and assembly. We
first choose Aluminized Mylar material to produce a membrane. Compared with re-
duced Graphene Oxide (rGO) membrane, AMF membrane is less sensitive to acoustic
wave but are easier to fabricate, because aluminized sheet can be easily purchased as
COTS and needs no further processing. We cut seven holes on two PET sheets, and
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glue the AMF membrane in between them as shown in Fig. 4.4(b). After that, the
membrane is sandwiched between two electrodes and assembled into the 3D-printed
transducer structure as shown in Fig. 4.4(a).
reduced Graphene Oxide (rGO) membrane fabrication. The rGO membranes
are relatively difficult to fabricate compared with its AMF counterpart. The whole
fabrication process is based on drop casting method [26]. The Graphene Oxide (GO)
water dispersion for drop casting is first prepared by dissolving and sonicating 0.5
ml commercial ultra-high concentration graphene oxide aqueous solution (6.2g/L)
in 2 ml high purity water. The GO water dispersion is then dropped cast onto a
piece of SiO2 wafer putting on the hotplate. After 105◦C baking, a GO thin film is
formed on the SiO2 substrate. The SiO2 substrate with solid GO membrane is then
immersed into the hydroiodic acid for 10 min of chemical reduction. After that, the
SiO2 is withdrawn from the acid and put into high purity water container to rinse and
to maintain the hydrophobic property of rGO surface. Finally, the rGO membrane
will naturally be separated from SiO2 and floats on the water surface. A Kapton
tape can be used to pick up the membrane to suspend for Ultimate Tensile Strength
(UTS) measurement and deployment. A small flake was cut off to measure thickness
by Atomic Force Microscopy (AFM). The measurement indicates that the diluted
rGO membrane is about 400 nm (or 0.4 µm) with a minimum UTS of 191 MPa.
Fig. 4.4(c) shows a well-fabricated rGO membrane. After the membrane is made, it
can be assembled into the 3D-printed transducer structure.
4.3 Amplifier Circuit Design
The signals directly captured from the membrane vibration are extremely weak
signals, which require amplification for further processing. URadio incorporates two
15
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.4: The assembled transducers: (a) 3D-printed transducer; (b) an assembled
transducer with AMF membrane; (c) an assembled transducer with rGO membrane.
types of amplifiers including a power amplifier (PA) at the transmitter and a low noise
amplifier (LNA) at the receiver, since the received signal at the receiver is particularly
susceptible to noise.
At the transmitter, we choose a commercial power amplifier with an operational
frequency ranging from 50 kHz to 1.2MHz and a voltage gain of 40 dB and a maximum
voltage of 27 V. The LNA at the receiver requires an extremely low noise figure (< 13
dB) to constrain noises’ impacts, with a broad bandwidth (at least 100 kHz - 1 MHz)
and a high gain (at least 35 dB), especially when the system performs high-speed
data transmission. The COTS amplifiers are usually either too narrow in bandwidth
or too high in noise figure. Only a few specially designed LNA can meet the needs.
Here, we design our own LNA system. At the receiver side, two chips, OPA637BP
and OPA1611 are employed to build a 2-stage amplifier circuit with a high gain up
to 30 dB, a broad bandwidth from DC to 1 MHz. Fig. 4.5 shows the schematic
16
diagram of the designed circuit. Since the circuit copes with extremely weak electric
current (down to 10 µA), it has to be designed in a way that allows the electronic
components in the circuit to be isolated. Therefore, the electronic components have to
be soldered on a copper board with pins off the ground. Self-excitation easily occurs in
this 2-stage amplifier circuits due to the high gain (i.e., 30 dB or equivalent to 1, 000×
gain). To suppress self-excitation, a customizable small capacitor (i.e., C2 in Fig. 4.5)
is used to connect the input and the output of the first-stage amplifier, shifting the
self-exciting frequency of this circuit to a much higher frequency (>10 MHz), thereby
effectively suppressing it. As is shown in Fig. 4.6, the frequency response of this
2-stage amplifier circuit has a broad operational 3 dB bandwidth from DC to 1 MHz.
After assembling AMF transducers, we measure the frequency response of transmitter
and receiver transducers integrated with the amplifier circuit, the result of which is
shown in Fig. 4.7. Compared with Fig. 4.2, the URadio system integrated with AMF
transducers presents a wide 3 dB bandwidth from 60 kHz to above 1 MHz that can
be used for ultrasonic communication, which indicates at least 45× more bandwidth
than SensComp transducers. The frequency response drops between DC to 60 kHz,
which is caused by the transmitter side power amplifier who has a cutoff operational
frequency around 50 to 60 kHz.
C2
R2
-
+
C1 R1
Input from 
transducer
R3
R4 C3
-
+
C4 R5
OutputOPA637BP OPA1611
Figure 4.5: The schematic diagram of LNA circuit (C1 – C4 are capacitors, and R1
– R5 are resistors).
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Figure 4.6: The frequency response of LNA circuit.
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Figure 4.7: Frequency response of AMF transducers (integrated with amplifier cir-
cuits) over a distance of 20 cm.
4.4 Wideband Ultrasonic OFDM Communication System De-
sign
In URadio, due to the available wide bandwidth, OFDM modulation is used to
maximize the spectrum utilization. We follow the WiFi protocol by embedding 52
subcarriers into one OFDM symbol. We utilize linear frequency modulation (LFM)
to achieve frame synchronization. Similar to WiFi, a long training sequence (LTS)
is used to achieve fine-grained time synchronization. Carrier Phase Offset (CFO)
correlation is used to correct the distortion of the baseband signal. Then, phase error
estimation and channel estimation are performed to estimate the channel response
and mitigate the channel distortion, thus making the system adaptive to different
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types of channels. The complete OFDM modulation and demodulation process are
shown in Fig. 3.1, while the structure of our OFDM-based frame is shown in Fig. 4.8.
4.4.1 Synchronization
Synchronization in URadio is achieved in two steps. First, the receiver identifies
any incoming packet via coarse synchronization, which relies on an LFM signal located
at the beginning of each packet and served as a preamble. Once a packet is detected, a
fine synchronization will be processed by the receiver to determine the exact starting
time of packet payload. The fine synchronization is achieved by correlating the down-
converted signal with a local copy of preamble, i.e., LTS. The correlation peaks at
the received symbol’s starting position.
LFM GuardZeros
Guard 
Interval LTS LTS Payload LFM
Guard
Zeros
SubcarriersCyclic Prefix
Payload …
Figure 4.8: The structure of an OFDM-based frame.
The LFM preamble is a sinusoidal waveform whose frequency varies linearly from
an initial frequency f0 to an end frequency f1 within a certain time period T . LFM
signal is also called a chirp signal, which is widely used in radars due to its superior
autocorrelation and robustness against additive stochastic noise [27]. The LFM signal
can be described as the following formula:
S(t) = A · cos(2pit(f0 + k/2 ∗ t) + φ), (4.4)
where f0 is the starting frequency, k is the rate of frequency change, A is the ampli-
tude, and φ is the phase. The correlation peaks of the received signal with a local
copy of LFM indicates the start of the arriving data sequence.
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After the frame synchronization and downconversion, we use a cross-correlator to
search for the 64-sample LTS in the preamble to achieve a fine synchronization. An
LTS preamble consists of a sequence of {-1, 1}. Fig. 4.8 shows two successive LTS
used in an OFDM frame. The two LTS preambles are used to precisely locate the
start of a packet payload, marking the boundary of each OFDM frame fed into the
FFT module.
4.4.2 Channel Estimation
Ultrasonic communications over the air are greatly affected by frequency selec-
tivity and multipath fading of an ultrasonic channel. In URadio, LTS is used to
estimate the channel impulse response (CIR) and compensate for the channel distor-
tion, in order to turn the frequency-selective channel into a flat channel. During the
demodulation, the LTS preambles at the beginning of each package that is known
by the receiver are used to correct the phase and amplitude of the received OFDM
signals. Thus, the channel estimation Hest can be expressed as:
Hest = LTS ∗ (LTS ′1 + LTS ′2)/2,
where LTS ′1 and LTS ′2 are the FFT results of first and second LTS of the received
signal, and LTS is a known LTS copy.
4.4.3 Bandwidth Selection
The operational bandwidth of this system is restricted by two factors: the trans-
ducers’ resonant frequency and the orthogonality of the carrier signals. As a rule
of thumb, the operational bandwidth should be centered around the transducers’
resonant frequency. In URadio, we use correlation demodulator to achieve downcon-
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version at the receiver side. When the carrier frequency fc is not far greater than the
bandwidth, strict orthogonal condition is required for the correlation demodulator to
operate successfully. The orthogonal condition can be described as follows:
∫ Ts
0
cos(2pifct)sin(2pifct)dt = 0, (4.5)
where Ts is the duration of one symbol, and Ts = 1/BW , where BW is the bandwidth.
Via simple derivation from Eq. (4.5), we can get: sin2(2pifcTs) = sin2(2pifc/BW ) = 0.
Therefore, to maintain such an orthogonality, carrier frequency has to be an integer
multiple of a half bandwidth:
fc
BW
=
n
2
, (4.6)
where n ∈ Z and n ≥ 1. Let fh and fl donate the high and low cutoff frequency of
a symbol, then fc = (fh + fl)/2, BW = fh − fl. Therefore, Eq. (4.6) can be further
expressed as:
fh =
n+ 1
n− 1fl. (4.7)
Eq. (4.7) implies that the bandwidth (or the difference between fh and fl) is
inversely proportional to n, and n ≥ 1. As fl 6= 0 and fh 6= ∞, n ≥ 2. Thus, we
choose n = 2, fh = 900 kHz, fl = 300 kHz with a bandwidth of 600 kHz for our
lab-made AMF and rGO transducers.
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Chapter 5
Performance Evaluation
We implement URadio system including both hardware and software components.
In this chapter, we conduct comprehensive experiments to evaluate the performance
of URadio system. We perform the experiments in a lab environment, and measure
URadio’s communication and security performance.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Fig. 5.1 presents the experimental arrangement for this ultrasonic communication
system. The data is processed and modulated by MATLAB programs that run on
a laptop before sending to a Keysight 33500B waveform generator using a general
purpose interface bus (GPIB). The signals from the waveform generator are amplified
by two GWBP-AMP-X75 Power Amplifiers. The two amplifiers are powered by DC
power supplies with a voltage of 24 V and cooled down using two fans. The signals
are then transmitted by our ultrasonic transducer. Travelling through the air, the
air-coupled ultrasonic signals are then captured by another ultrasonic transducer that
is connected to an LNA hosted in a Faraday box. The Faraday box is used to shield
electromagnetic interference from RF signals. The amplified signals are then digitized
by a Tektronix oscilloscope and sent back to the laptop for post-processing via an
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of the benchtop experimental setup for URadio communi-
cation.
Ethernet cable.
5.2 Experimental Results of Communication Capability
We conduct the experiments in an indoor lab environment with no detectable
ultrasonic background noise. The transmitter and receiver exchange ultrasonic signals
over an LoS link. Four different types of baseband modulation schemes, i.e., BPSK,
QPSK, 16-QAM, and 64-QAM, are used to modulate the OFDM subcarrier signals
that range from 45 to 65 kHz in the URadio system with SensComp transducers, or
cover from 300 to 900 kHz in the URadio system with the lab-made AMF and rGO
transducers.
Our first experiment evaluates and compares the performance metrics such as
bandwidth, data rate, transmission range, SNR, bit error rate (BER) of all the four
modulation schemes using SensComp, AMF, and rGO ultrasonic transducers. The
BER performance is measured by fixing the communication range (1 m for SensComp,
15 cm for lab-made transducers) and tuning the transmission power. Each 140 byte
packet signal is transmitted 10 times. The maximum transmission range using our
current instruments with non-detectable BER is listed in Table 5.1. As can be seen
from Table 5.1, URadio achieves a high date rate of 1.2 Mbps, 2.4 Mbps, and 4.8
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Table 5.1: URadio communication performance.
Transducers Mod fc BW Data Rate Range SNR BERType (kHz) (kHz) (Kbps) (cm) (dB)
SensComp
BPSK
50 20
20 1,030 9
< 1e-4QPSK 40 680 10.216QAM 80 440 15.5
64QAM 160 350 17.7
AMF
BPSK
600 600
600 27 8.1
< 1e-4QPSK 1,200 25 9.816QAM 2,400 20 15.9
64QAM 4,800 15 18
rGO
BPSK
600 600
600 35 8.1
< 1e-4QPSK 1,200 31 1016QAM 2,400 23 15.7
64QAM 4,800 17 17.8
Mbps while using the lab-made transducers with QPSK, 16-QAM and 64-QAM, re-
spectively. The results indicate URadio enables high speed ultrasonic data exchange;
URadio can also have a long transmission distance of 10.3 m when using SensComp
transducers with BPSK modulation, enabling long range data exchange. It is note-
worthy that lab-made transducers’ transmission range (27 cm and 35 cm using BPSK
for AMF membrane and rGO membrane) is limited by the maximum output power
(0.54 watt) of our high bandwidth amplifiers GWBP-AMP-X75 at the transmitter.
We also expect the communication range to extend with a better acoustic engineer-
ing, which we leave for future work. AMF membrane based transducer has similar
BER performance as its rGO membrane based counterpart because of their similar
structure. Fig. 5.2 shows the BER performance of URadio equipped with SensComp
transducers and AMF/rGO transducers. The URadio system with AMF/rGO trans-
ducers can achieve 10−5 BER at 10 dB SNR using QPSK, and there is a considerable
performance gap between systems using QPSK and 16-QAM schemes.
In the second experiment, we evaluate the image transmission performance to
validate the high bandwidth transmission capability of the URadio system using rGO
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Figure 5.2: BER performance of different transducers using different modulation
schemes. SC-BPSK, SC-QPSK, SC-16QAM, SC-64QAM represent the performance
of URadio with SensComp transducers at a communication range of 1 m, while lab-
BPSK, lab-QPSK, lab-16QAM, lab-64QAM represent the performance of URadio
with lab-made AMF and rGO transducers at a communication range of 15 cm.
membrane. We transform a 512 × 512 pixels bmp format Lena image with 8 bit
grey scale into bits, and use the URadio system to achieve image transmission at
different transmission ranges, such as 15 cm, 20 cm, 25 cm. The entire transmission
process takes around 900 ms using 16-QAM at a data rate of 2.4 Mbps, showing that
URadio is capable of initiating large data transfer that is very useful for a variety of
smart home applications. Fig. 5.3 shows the received Lena pictures across different
communication ranges, the quality of which degrades with increasing distances.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5.3: Received Lena pictures using 16-QAM with different distances between
Alice and Bob: (a) distance = 15 cm, SNR = 18.8 dB; (b) distance = 20 cm, SNR =
15.4 dB; (c) distance = 25 cm, SNR = 10.86 dB; (d) distance = 30 cm, SNR = 3.9
dB.
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Figure 5.4: Eavesdropping attacks with an angle θ between the eavesdropper Eve
and the LoS link of the benign transmission between Alice and Bob. The distances
between Alice and Bob, Alice and Eve are set as the same: (a) eavesdropping attack
experimental setup; (b) SNR of Eve with different eavesdropping angles and distances
using BPSK.
5.3 Security Evaluation
Ultrasonic signal transmits efficiently over an LoS link, and any angular devia-
tion may result in a significant loss of SNR, which is also the reason why URadio
can effectively counter eavesdropping attacks. The URadio system assembled with a
pair of SensComp transducers is used to test the relationship between eavesdropping
angles, SNR, and BER with different distances between Alice and Eve, as shown in
Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5. We can see from Fig. 5.5 that URadio communication can be
eavesdropped at a wider angle at 3 m, but a small eavesdropping angle of 5◦ will still
result in an SNR loss of at least 5 dB as shown in Fig. 5.4(b). Moreover, a 10◦ angular
deviation can cause an SNR dip of more than 25 dB, 20 dB, and 10 dB with a dis-
tance of 1 m, 2 m, and 3 m, respectively. Notably, higher order modulation schemes
are more secure against eavesdroppers, with which the BER performance degrades
dramatically when there is a slight angular deviation. This result indicates that eaves-
dropping URadio’s data transfer will suffer from low channel quality, leading to a low
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Figure 5.5: BER performance of an eavesdropper with different eavesdropping angles
and different distances.
eavesdropping quality. It is worth-noting that: as the transmission distance increases,
the 3dB-SNR-loss transmission angle slightly increases. The results demonstrate the
URadio’s secure communication capability enabled by ultrasound.
We also evaluate the jamming resilience performance of URadio system (equipped
with SensComp transducers) by setting up an experiment as shown in Fig. 5.6. We
let Eve continuously transmit an ultrasonic jamming signal to Bob, while Bob is
receiving benign signals from Alice. Alice is positioned 5 meters away from Bob; Eve
is at different positions on the vertical bisector pointing to Bob. The jamming signal
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Figure 5.6: Eve launches jamming attack to disrupt the communication between Alice
and Bob: (a) jamming attack experimental setup (distance between Alice and Bob is
5 m); (b) SNR of Bob for the benign communication under attack.
Table 5.2: Performance comparison.
Related Systems Modulation Type Data Rate (bps) Range (cm)
U-Wear [5] 16QAM-OFDM 2.76K N/A
BackDoor [6] AM 4K 100
Chirp [7] chirp 4K 100
Multi-Tone [8] MFSK 800 N/A
Short-Range [10] QPSK 200K 1,200
Indoor [11] 16QAM-OFDM 800K 70
URadio-SC BPSK-OFDM 20K 1,030
URadio-rGO 64QAM-OFDM 4.8M 17
URadio-SC is the URadio system with SensComp transducers.
URadio-rGO is the URadio system with rGO transducers.
is a band-limited Gaussian white noise with its power equal to the source power sent
by Alice and its bandwidth covering the entire frequency range of SensComp (i.e.,
45 kHz - 65 kHz). The result is shown in Fig. 5.6, which indicates that jamming
attack can only effectively reduce the SNR of received signal by at least 3 dB when
the distance is less than 30 cm, demonstrating URadio’s jamming resilience.
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5.4 Performance Comparison
Table 5.2 compares URadio with other state-of-the-art airborne ultrasonic com-
munication systems according to their maximum transmission range and maximum
data rate. As is shown in Table 5.2, when using SensComp transducers for data com-
munication, URadio achieves a longer transmission range. While using rGO trans-
ducers, URadio significantly improves the data rate at a short range. URadio so
far has the highest data rate (i.e., 4.8 Mbps), which is 6× faster than the previous
best system. Therefore, if the data throughput is considered as the first priority, our
lab-made transducers with broader bandwidth should be used. On the other hand,
if the transmission range is considered as the top priority, Senscomp 600 series could
be employed. Compared with previous work that primarily considers a small amount
of data exchange, URadio can handle large size file transfer. The high-speed commu-
nication capability integrated with security features make URadio well suited to be
adopted in secure smart home applications.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we presented URadio, a secure and high data rate ultrasonic commu-
nication system. Using a pair of COTS transducers, URadio can achieve an attainable
range of 10.3 meter at a data rate of 20 Kbps. We designed two types of new trans-
ducers using membranes made of thin materials including Aluminized Mylar Film
and reduced Graphene Oxide. The proposed system was able to achieve a record-
high data rate of 4.8 Mbps with an attainable range of 17 cm. The relatively short
range of lab-made transducers was caused by the limited power upper bound of the
power amplifier that could be improved if a higher gain power amplifier is used, as
well as the lack of acoustic engineering. Image transmission quality was evaluated to
prove that our system can achieve high-speed data exchange in an error-free manner.
We evaluated URadio’s security performance by measuring eavesdropping angles and
jamming attack distances, which corroborates the security of URadio communication.
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